Flare-On 6 (tasks 10-12)

Flare-On 6

Flare-On Challenge is an annual competition organized by FireEye (the FLARE team). It is like a marathon of reverse engineering. Each year we get 12 crackmes of increasing difficulty to solve. You can download the tasks here.

This year I finished as 106.

In this post I will describe the last 3 tasks of the competition:

WARNING: Work in progress. I will be adding more details to this post.

Task 10 – “Mugatu”

[Mugatu.7z; password: flare]

In this task we get an EXE (Mugatu.exe) and two encrypted GIFs: best.gif.Mugatu, the_key_to_success_0000.gif.Mugatu.


The EXE is a ransomware, and the two GIFs are encrypted by it. We are supposed to decrypt one of those GIFs (best.gif.Mugatu) in order to get the flag.

The EXE is slightly obfuscated. For example, the Imports are replaced at runtime by some other imports. So, analyzing it statically we may get confused. In order to analyze it statically with a valid result, we should recover its real imports first. In order to do this, we can just dump it from memory once it is run by any dumper that can reconstruct the imports. In my opinion, the best for this task is Scylla. Once we have the main exe dumped with proper imports reconstructed, it becomes much more readable.

Inside the main executable there is a payload, that is the core of the ransomware. It is manually loaded by the main EXE. We can unpack this DLL statically in the following way:

  • in the resources of the main EXE there are 2 bitmaps on the same size.
  • We need to XOR one with another. (I did it using: dexor.py )
  • As a result, we will get an executable (with some padding at the beginning).
  • We need to remove the padding, and that’s how we’ve got the resulting DLL, named Derelicte.dll.dll_name

However, it is not that simple. If we extracted the DLL statically, we will find that its imports don’t make much sense. It is because the main EXE replaces them on load. So, we need to find the valid imports for this DLL.

We can see the fragment of EXE’s code where the DLL is manually loaded.

The imports are loaded in an obfuscated way, that makes them quite difficult to reconstruct. They are not filled directly to the thunks, but into a proxy list, that looks in the following way:

Due to the used import obfuscation, the previous simple trick of running it and dumping won’t work again. We could try to deobfuscate them from the memory, but the better approach is to patch the loader, and just prevent the obfuscation from being applied.

Let’s take a look at the function that do the import loading. Just after the Import address is fetched, it is obfuscated:

It is being filled in the chunk of the emitted code:

In order to prevent the obfuscation, I applied some patches in the loader:

1) do not obfuscate the import address


2) write the import address directly to the thunk, not to the proxy


Then I dumped it with PE-sieve with option imp 3 (complete Import Table reconstruction). As a result I got a valid DLL that I could easily analyze statically. The import table reconstructed by PE-sieve:

After the DLL is manually loaded within the main EXE, it’s Entry Point (the DllMain function) is being called:

Then, an exported function is being called, with a parameter “CrazyPills!!!”:


Once we follow this function in a DLL, we will see the logic responsible for encrypting files.

The function that does the encryption is not called directly, but via obfuscated callback:


This callback is deobfuscated by XOR with the argument supplied to the function:


By following it in the debugger to the place where the deobfuscation is done, we can see the address of the callback function:

The callback is the function at RVA = 0x16b9.

We can follow it in IDA:


If we analyze it closer, we will find that it is an XTEA algorithm, but with few modifications. First we need to write a decrypting function for it.

I found this implementation very helpful to base my decryptor upon. The few things that are changed comparing to this implementation are: the delta, and the key buffer type (in the original implementation the key is an array of DWORDs). The second modification makes the strength of the crypto significantly lower: the key has only  4 BYTEs, not 4 DWORDs as in the valid implementation, so it is easy to be bruteforced.

The solution to this task:



Task 11 – “vv_max”

[vv_max.7z; password: flare]

In this task we are facing a Virtual Machine, using AVX2 instructions. That’s why it will not work on some older processors which have no AVX2 support. If we try to run it on such processor we get the following message: “Your processor/OS is ‘too old'”.


If the machine supports AVX2, it passes the verification, and prints “Nope!” in case of a wrong input.

Overview of the main function responsible for verifying the arguments.

The function that I renamed to “vm_process_bytecode” is responsible for calculating some “hash” from the input. Then in the function “vm_check_flag” this “hash” is being compared to a hardcoded one.

Inside this function “vm_check_flag”:

At this moment we know that the crackme expects 2 commandline arguments. The first one must be “FLARE2019”, the second: a 32 bit long string. The second argument is processed by a function implemented by the VM, and the result is compared with a hardcoded “hash” that is 24 bytes long.

The fragment of code responsible for making the comparison:

The valid “hash”:

70 70 B2 AC 01 D2 5E 61 0A A7 2A A8 08 1C 86 1A E8 45 C8 29 B2 F3 A1 1E

Rather than analyzing the functionality in the details, I decided to treat the VM as a black-box, and make some tests, checking how the output changes depending on the given input.

I noticed that the input is processed in chunks. A single chunk of 4 bytes gives 3 bytes of the output. Also, I understood that it is not a hash, but rather some encoding, because a change in a single byte of the the chunk content was not fully changing the output content.

At this moment I decided that I  will try to brutforce the solution, by finding appropriate chunk of the input for each chunk of the output. Yet, I wanted to avoid re-implementing the full VM, so I decided to go for some sort of instrumentation of the original code.

After trying various options, I decided to use the patched version of the original sample. I patched in this way that the returned value (DWORD) will contain the selected bytes of the output.

The modified version of the  “vm_check_flag” function:

I removed the part responsible for comparing the “hash” calculated from the input with the hardcoded one. Instead, we will just copy its chunk into EAX register. Then, we need to NOP out the code that sets the EAX register to 0.

Let’s test the prepared sample using one of the saved input-output sets. We will be checking the output chunk with the help of a command:

echo %errorlevel%


Input: "01111111111111111111111111111119"
Output: D3 5D 75 D7 5D 75 D7 5D 75 D7 5D 75 D7 5D 75 D7 5D 75 D7 5D 75 D7 5D 7D

DWORD=-680174125 -> D7755DD3 (little endian) -> D3 5D 75 D7

As we can see, the returned value is valid.

Now we just need to write a brutforcing application that will integrate the patched module, and crack the full value, chunk by chunk. After each iteration we need to patch the app again and change the ECX value, in order to advance to the next chunk. So, in the first round ECX = 0.

Since each output chunk is 3 bytes long, we will use only 3 bytes from the returned DWORD. Also, the value of the ECX will be advancing in the increments of 3.

During the tests with the brutforcer I noticed, that rather than trying to crack the 4 byte long input chunk as a whole, I should crack it by finding:

  1. 1-st byte of the input that gives the 1-st byte of the output
  2. 4-th (last) byte of the output hat gives the 3-rd (last) byte of the output
  3. two middle values of the input (2nd and 3rd) that gives middle (3rd) value of the output

Finding this was able to speed up the cracking time a lot. I also automated the process of patching the ECX in the modified vv_max executable.

This is the complete solution:


During the process of cracking I started to notice that the output looks like something familiar… Yes, it is Base64! I noticed it too late – but from the other hand side it was so much fun to write this crazy bruteforcer for it!

Task 12 – “help”

In this task we receive a memory dump: help.dmp, along with a pcap: help.pcap. Both have been captured on the infected system. Our task is to analyze the infection.

I started by using volatility. First, I found what was the profile appropriate to analyze the given OS. For some reason volatility detected it as Windows 10 64 bit. However, loading the dump with this profile resulted in errors. Most of the volatility functions were not working. It turned the OS is just detected wrongly. If we open the same dump in WinDbg, we see that in reality it is Windows 7 SP1 64bit. We needed to manually find the appropriate volatility profile. The one that turned out to be valid is:


Finally, after this change, we could see a significant improvement, and volatility started to work as it was supposed to.

I poked around, listing processes, network connections, drivers… One thing that drawn my attention was a driver man.sys, with a path containing “Flare On 2019” keywords.

volatility -f help.dmp --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 modules

Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Offset(V)          Name                 Base                             Size File
------------------ -------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ----
0xfffffa800183e890 ntoskrnl.exe         0xfffff80002a49000           0x5e7000 \SystemRoot\system32\ntoskrnl.exe
0xfffffa800183e7a0 hal.dll              0xfffff80002a00000            0x49000 \SystemRoot\system32\hal.dll
0xfffffa800183e6c0 kdcom.dll            0xfffff80000bac000            0x2a000 \SystemRoot\system32\kdcom.dll
0xfffffa80039c4630 bthpan.sys           0xfffff880032c8000            0x20000 \SystemRoot\system32\DRIVERS\bthpan.sys
0xfffffa800428ff30 man.sys              0xfffff880033bc000             0xf000 \??\C:\Users\FLARE ON 2019\Desktop\man.sys

Unfortunately we cannot dump it by volatility, because its header is erased. So, I loaded the same dump to WinDbg and dumped it using .writemem:

.writemem C:\dumps\man1.bin fffff880`033bc000 fffff880`033cb000

Since the driver has no header, we need to reconstruct it manually. We don’t need to get all the sections right – we need just basic things to make it suitable for static analysis. The most important is to get the imports right.
First, I copied the PE-header from another driver – I used it as a base on which I started to rebuild. Then, I reviewed the file in a hexeditor, in search for familiar patterns. I could distinguish two sections, so I added their headers:
I noticed where the list of the imported DLLs is located, and tried to find the beginning of the structure, in order to fill it in the Data Directory.
My final version of Data Directory has the following form:
Now we can open the file in IDA, just like any other PE. We still need to find the Entry Point (DriverEntry), and fill it in the header. I found some unreferenced function it at RVA 0x5110 – it is very likely to be the Entry Point:


The full reconstructed Optional Header:

Let’s open the driver in IDA again, and analyze what is going on in DriverEntry. We can see that the driver injected something in the process 876:

Let’s dump this full process using volatility, so that we can see what was injected there:

volatility -f help.dmp --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 memdump -p 876 -D mem_dumps/

Indeed – this element contains other pieces of the “malware”. I carved them out using a hexeditor.


Most of the strings used in the “malware” are encrypted with RC4 – each using a different, hardcoded key. The same obfuscation method is used in each module. So, it is useful to make a decoder that would be able to statically deobfuscate it.

We are also given a PCAP file. So, we need to somehow make sense out of the network traffic, and what is its relationship with the found “malware”. The volatility will also be helpful in seeing which process was responsible for what part of the traffic. We can see it using the command:

volatility -f help.dmp --profile=Win7SP1x64_23418 netscan

We can correlate the traffic generated by the svchost (PID 876) with the traffic recorded in the PCAP. Let’s dump the packages and try to decode them. There is a huge amount of the traffic on the port 7777. When we dump those packages, we can see inside some repeating patterns. I visualized one of the dumps (using file2png.py) to get an idea what can possibly be hidden inside. This is the result:

Looking at the visualization we can guess, that it is not a PE file encoded, but rather a bitmap. (If it was a PE the patterns inside would look very different: in that image there is a lot of content that looks to be filled by the same characters – and in PE we would not have so much padding between the sections.)

After finding the proper XOR key (thanks to Mark Lechtik), I got the decoded content, that was indeed a series of bitmaps. As it turned out: screenshots from the infected system.

The screenshots give some very important hints on how is the flag stored. As we can see, it is in the KeyPass database. The masterkey is covered, but we know that it is typed on the screen, so we can suspect that the keylogger component should have caught it. It will probably be sent in some other part of the traffic.

I decided to find the KeyPass database first. I needed to check what exactly was the version of KeyPass. In order to do this, I dumped the KeyPass process. It turned out to be KeyPass 1.37. I installed the same version and checked what is the header for this format. Then, I carved out the valid file with this header.


The next step is to find the password! I confirmed that crypto.dll is the layer that decrypts that part of the traffic (thanks to Alex Polyakov and Alex Skalozub for answering my questions and confirming that this is the good direction to follow). I analyzed the crypto.dll and made a decryptor for the packets.


The traffic at the port 8888 contained the keylogged content (captured by keylog.dll), and the traffic on the port 6666 – the stolen files (fetched by filedll.dll). It turned out that the uploded file was keys.kdb – the same file that I carved out from the disk – so it was another way of retrieving this piece. I found that the hashes of both match, so I confirmed that I have the valid kdb. I found also something that looked like the key to the database: “th1sisth33nd111”.


Yet, this key didn’t work!

At this point I wasn’t sure if I went in a good direction, so I asked Alex Polyakov for the hint. He confirmed that this is indeed the key captured by the keylogger, but it is in a bit different form than the key that was typed… I tried to find something similar but yet different recorded in the memory, by grepping through the strings of the main dump (help.dmp). After many failed attempts, I got an idea that the number ‘1’ at the end can be in reality ‘!’. And I tried the following command:

cat help_strings.txt | grep -i 3nd!

I found the following string:


Still, it didn’t work… But I noticed that the first characters are missing, so I tried:


And finally it worked, I got the kdb unlocked and the flag has shown up!

That’s all! I hope you enjoyed my writeup. Sourcodes of all my Flare-On solutions are available here: https://github.com/hasherezade/flareon2019

Thanks to the Flare team for the great contest!


FlareOn6 Write-Up of Write-Ups – aggregator and summary of varorious solutions
View at Medium.com

Posted in CrackMe | Tagged , | 1 Comment

Application shimming vs Import Table recovery

In this post I am sharing a case that I investigated recently, during the tests of my application, PE-sieve. It demonstrates how the shims applied by the operating system can disrupt Imports recovery.

Tested features

Recently I had a new release of PE-sieve. One of the added features was a complete Import Table recovery. From now, if you run the PE-sieve with an option /imp 3 it will collect all the addresses that the scanned module imported from the DLLs in the memory, and construct a new Import Table out of them. It is a very useful feature that many PE dumpers have. It helps i.e. to deal with packed applications. Let’s take an example of UPX: it may compress the Import Table of the payload, and load it dynamically during unpacking.

PE-sieve offers also another, “milder” mode of the recovery (/imp 2). In this case PE-sieve bases on the existing import table, and only reconstruct the erased elements. It can be used i.e. in the following case, when the Thunks were overwritten by the functions addresses during the imports loading:


PE-sieve is able to recognize the exports that are at those addresses, and fills their names back into the table:


Test cases

I decided to test my application on some ready-made and well-known examples. I selected Anthracene’s unpacking series, available here.

The first sample (1dbfd12ad3ee39930578b949c6899d0a) looks pretty straight-forward. It is a simple application showing a MessageBox, packed with the help of UPX.


I run this example on one of my Virtual Machines (Windows 8 64 bit) and the imports got recovered flawlessly (video).

Later, I tried to do the same on a different machine, with another set of patches installed. For some reason, I could not reproduce the valid results. Import recovery “magically” stopped working – the received results were incomplete. When I tried to dump the payload with PE-sieve, using the option /imp 2 , all the functions imported from Kernel32.dll got recovered, but the function from User32: MessageBoxA did not.

First I assumed that it must be a bug in PE-sieve, but it turned out that other applications i.e. Scylla have the same problem: they cannot map this address to any of the exported functions.

I investigated the mentioned address under the debugger, and this is what I saw. The call to a MessageBoxA was proxied via apphelp:

The function used from the apphelp was not present in the export table, so it is logical that the applications recovering imports could not recognize it. So, it is not really a bug in the application – but a problem caused by some peculiar way in which this import was loaded.


Of course I wanted to understand what is the reason of such behavior. I suspected that there must be some shimming going on, but why did it happen? I checked other applications importing MessageBoxA, but each of them used this function directly from User32.dll, and apphelp.dll was not used as a proxy.

I started thinking that it may be related with the fact that my test case is a very old application.

The OS Version in the PE header is set to 4 (Win 95):

I made an experiment and”upgraded it”, just by changing the version number:

And it worked! After this simple change, the shim was no longer applied. The application used the import directly, and, as a result PE-sieve (and other applications) were able to properly recognize the function.

So, it turned out that the operating system applies this shim automatically for the backward compatibility with old applications.

Now when I think of it, it looks pretty obvious, but it was not so intuitive when I saw it for the first time, that’s why I decided to document this case. So, just a small heads-up: when the import recovery is not going right, first check if shims are not the reason! I hope you enjoyed my small writeup.


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PE-bear – version 0.3.9 available

[UPDATE] This release introduced some stability issues, fixed in

Hello! Several months have passed since I released PE-bear 0.3.8. Since it was my old, abandoned project, I did not plan to start developing it again. Initially, I got convinced to be adding only bugfixes, treating it rather as a legacy app. However, it started doing pretty good for a “dead” project. It got 15K+ new downloads, has been mentioned in some cool presentations, featured on OALabs, and added to FlareVM. It all made me reconsider my decision. Also, I started getting messages from users requesting new features. Finally, I decided to break what I said before, and prepare another release.

The current one (0.3.9) comes with some new features. You can download it from the main site of the project:


1. Added Rich Header (viewing and editing), with calculated checksum. Preview:


New PE-bear displays all the fields of RichHeader, and allows for their editing. It automatically calculates and verifies the Checksum, so it can help spotting the cases when the Rich Header was forged.

2. Added support for the new fields in Load Config Directory. Preview:


Since PE-bear is a pretty old project, it was not able to parse the full Load Config Directory, but only its basic form, ending on SEHHandlerCount. Now it supports the extensions introduced in Windows 8.1 and Windows 10.

3. In Debug Directory: parse and display RSDSI Table (including PDB path etc):


In the old version, Debug Directory was displayed, but without parsing the structure nested inside. Now, one of the most popular types, including PDB path, is also parsed: you can view the project path, and also edit it.

In addition, project underwent some internal refactoring, and I added some other tiny improvements.

I must say I started enjoying working on PE-bear again, and already got several new ideas that I am planning to implement. So, this release is not gonna be the last.

Big thanks to all of you who motivated me to “resurrect” this project. I hope you will enjoy the new version, and the PE-bear’s comeback. As always, I am open for any comments and suggestions.

Posted in PE-bear, Tools | 4 Comments

How to compile a PIN tool using Visual Studio 2017

UPDATE: the described problems in compiling the default PIN projects seems to be fixed in the new PIN release: 3.10.

PIN (of Intel) is a great platform for dynamic binary instrumentation. I use it on daily for tracing and deobfuscating malware, and I often recommend it to others. Unfortunately, figuring out how to set it up is not so straight-forward. If you want to compile the default projects that are distributed in the package, you may get multiple errors.

I never saw the full process of fixing them documented. I struggled with this myself, and from time to time people approach me asking for help. That’s why, I decided to make a walk-through, describing all the steps I did in order to get a tool compiled.

    • Used PIN package:
      • pin-3.7-97619-g0d0c92f4f-msvc-windows (link)
    • Environment:
      • Microsoft Visual Studio Community 2017 (Version 15.6.5)
      • Windows 8.1 64bit

Step 0 – I downloaded the PIN package and unpacked it into C:\pin\C_pin

I will be compiling MyPinTool, that is a part of the PIN Package:


Step 1 – I opened the single tool in Visual Studio and tried to compile it.


I got an error:


So, I searched the pin main directory, and I found where this file is. It was in “C:\pin\extras\xed-ia32\include\xed” (we need to pick a 32 bit version for a 32 bit build).


So, I included that folder:


[C/C++] -> [General] -> [Additional Include Directories]

Step 2 – I  tried to compile it again and got another error:


So, I went to disable SAFESEH. From:


[Linker] -> [Advanced] -> [Image Has Safe Exception Handlers]

I switched to:


[Linker] -> [Advanced] -> [Image Has Safe Exception Handlers] -> [No]

Step 3 – Another attempt of compilation, and another set of errors. This time at linking level:


I googled for those errors and I found this blog. Following the advice,  I solved it by adding “crtbeginS.obj” to additional dependencies:


[Linker] -> [Input] -> [Additional Dependencies] -> add: crtbeginS.obj

And finally! It compiled:


I can only say that it was the nastiest part of PIN, and now it should go much easier. There are various sample projects included in the package, very helpful in learning the functionality.

To make working with it even easier, I made some scripts that are adding PIN along with my favorite tracer to the context menu. Thanks to them, I can start tracing any EXE just by one click. You can find them here.



Posted in Tutorial | 6 Comments

PE-bear – version 0.3.8 available

It has been a long time since I abandoned PE-bear project (version 0.3.7 was released in 2014!). But due to the fact that it still has new downloads, and I keep getting messages from its users, I understood it would be a shame to leave it without any support. A tool is alive as long as someone wants to use it, so, here is an update for PE-bear.


As I wrote in the release notes, the latest release fixes several bugs . In this post I will elaborate on the most important changes and illustrate them with examples.

  1. Fixed bugs in parsing Delay Load Imports (64bit)

So, this is the old, incorrect version (example: winnet.dll, 64bit)


And in the new, corrected one:

delayed_imp_new2. Fixed bugs in parsing Load Config Directory (64bit)

This is the old, incorrect version:

load_config_old The fields ProcessHeapFlags and ProcessAffinityMask should be flipped, otherwise their sizes are incorrectly identified. It is fixed in the new release:


3. While adding a new section, the selected access rights were applied only if the section was loaded from the file. Also, in some alignments, there was a cave appearing between the previous section and the added one, that needed to be fixed manually in headers, or otherwise the application won’t run. This all is fixed in the current version.


Section test added by new version:


I fixed also some other, smaller bugs here and there. So if you like PE-bear, it’s time to update. And if you don’t know it yet, feel free to give it a try, because from now onward I am not gonna leave this app without support, and if you find any bug it will be fixed as soon as possible. However, I will do only minimalistic mantainance, so don’t ask me for some super cool new extra features. (Or maybe I get tempted for more… No, I won’t 😉)


Posted in PE-bear | 4 Comments

White Rabbit crackme!

UPDATE: We already got the three winners. Good job guys! However, we are waiting for the writeups to select the reward for the best one – so if you are still in between of doing the crackme, don’t give up!

UPDATE2: We got first writeups! All the upcoming ones will be linked under the section “Writeups”. The submission for the contest closes 20th February.

UPDATE3: Contest closed! The winner is @Eleemosynator with his writeup available here. Both writeups were very good and detailed, so we decided that the second one, by @pieceofsummer, also deserved a distinction and a bonus reward. Big thanks to both authors!

This time I would like to introduce a small contest organized by me and Grant Willcox. I wrote a small crackme and he volunteered to sponsor the rewards. The first 3 solutions will be rewarded by books chosen by the winners.

The crackme is a 32bit PE file. It shouldn’t be too difficult, but I didn’t want to make it boring either, so it has few tricks.


Disclaimer: I am not an author of the graphics used in the application, such as ASCII arts, icons and others. I don’t claim any rights to them.


You need to find the flag in format flag{...} and submit it ASAP to any of us as a DM on twitter (@hasherezade or @tekwizz123). After we announced that the contest is closed, we would like you to make a writeup explaining how did you solved it.

There will be an additional reward for the best writeup – so even if you was not the fastest, you still have a chance to get a book for free.

If you have any questions, you can write them as comments to this post and I will be answering them. I am not giving hints via private messages – I want the contest to be fair for everyone.

At the end I will publish my own writeup with a detailed explanation.


https://goo.gl/6iG4Ri (password: crackme)

Mind the fact, that the crackme contains some small obfuscation and malware-like tricks, so it may be flagged by some of the AV systems as malicious. False positives are very common when it comes to crackmes – it can’t be helped, sorry! I recommend you to run it on a Virtual Machine.


check_mark  Finished? You can rate it!


Posted in CrackMe | Tagged , | 9 Comments

Unpacking a malware with libPeConv (Pykspa case study)

In one of the recent episodes of “Open Analysis Live!” Sergei demonstrated how to statically unpack the Pykspa Malware using a Python script. If you haven’t seen this video yet, I recommend you to watch, it is available here – and the full series is really cool.

The video inspired me to use the same sample and demonstrate an alternative solution, applying my library, libPeConv . The advantage of using libPeConv is that you don’t have to spend time on understanding and rewriting the unpacking algorithm. Instead, you can import the original unpacking function from the original malware. It can speed up the work and be helpful also in the cases when the function of our interest is obfuscated.

Analyzed sample


Static analysis

The static analysis of this malware is already well demonstrated in the mentioned video. I will just recall the important points to which we are going to refer.

Function definition

The function that is responsible for unpacking is available at RVA 0x4520. It has the following prototype:


By analyzing how it is applied, we can find out what are the arguments that should be passed:


The first one is a blob of data (BYTE*), second – size of the blob (DWORD), next comes the name of the file where the output will be written, and last one is some magic char. This is how the function declaration should look:

int __cdecl *unpack_func(BYTE* blob, DWORD blob_size, LPCSTR lpFileName, char magic_val);

Function arguments

The function is applied twice, to decrypt two blobs of data (I call them blob1 and blob2). Important things to note are: the offsets of the blobs, their sizes and the passed magic values.

Decrypting blob1:


  • Blob1 RVA: 0xC030
  • Blob1 size: 0x11000

By following the code before the function call, we can find that the last argument (the magic char) must have the value ‘r’.


Decrypting blob2:


  • Blob2 RVA: 0x1D038
  • Blob2 size: 0x50000

Again, the magic value is ‘r’:


Now we have all the data to implement a static unpacker.

Writing a unpacker

Setting up the project

For this part you need to have Visual Studio, CMake and Git installed.

I already prepared a template that you can use to make a libPeConv-based project, so it is enough to fetch it from my Github: https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv_project_template

git clone --recursive https://github.com/hasherezade/libpeconv_project_template.git

Now use the CMake to generate a VisualStudio project:


The malware is 32bit, so it is important to generate a project for 32bit build, otherwise we will not be able to import the sample. Example:


Click “Finish” then  “Generate” and finally you can open the project in Visual Studio.

Unpacker’s code

Code of the full unpacker is very short:


Firstly, we load the original malware (by a function from peconv). We need it to be loaded with all the dependencies and ready to be executed. A function that allows to achieve it is load_pe_executable:

BYTE* peconv::load_pe_executable(LPCSTR path_to_pe, size_t &out_size);

This malware sample has no relocation table, so we not only need it loaded, but it must be loaded at it’s original base. This operation may fail on some runs, so we have to keep it in mind.

size_t v_size = 0;
BYTE *malware = peconv::load_pe_executable(mal_path, v_size);
if (!malware) return -1;

Then, using the known offset and the reconstructed declaration of the unpacking function, we are importing it from the loaded malware.

ULONGLONG func_offset = (ULONGLONG)malware + 0x4520;
unpack_func = (int (__cdecl *) (BYTE*, DWORD, LPCSTR, char)) func_offset;

We also use the known offsets of the blobs, and make pointers to the data. After we called the unpacking function with appropriate arguments, our payloads will be dumped to files with the supplied names.

DWORD res1 = unpack_func((BYTE*)((ULONGLONG) malware + blob1_offset), blob1_size, "blob1_unpack.bin", 'r');
std::cout << "Unpacked blob1, res:" << res1 << std::endl;

DWORD res2 = unpack_func((BYTE*)((ULONGLONG) malware + blob2_offset), blob2_size, "blob2_unpack.bin", 'r');
std::cout << "Unpacked blob2, res:" << res2 << std::endl;

At the end we can free the loaded malware:

peconv::free_pe_buffer(malware, v_size);

That’s all, the unpacker is ready. One last thing we can do is preparing a .bat file that will run the unpacker until the malware get loaded (remember the loading base issue caused by the missing relocation table).

Example of the batch script:

@echo off
peconv_project.exe malware.bin

The full package (except the malware) is available here:

Finally, let’s see it in action:

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